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There is an important hemispheric distinction in the functional organization of prefrontal
cortex (PFC) that has not been fully recognized and explored. Research with split-brain
patients provides considerable evidence for a left hemisphere (LH) “interpreter” that
abhors indeterminacy and automatically draws inferences to complete patterns (real or
imaginary). It is suggested that this “interpreter” function may be a byproduct of the
linguistic capabilities of the LH. This same literature initially limited the role of the right
hemisphere (RH) to little more than visual organization. Recent reviews have garnered
evidence for several different roles for the right PFC in reasoning, problem solving, and
decision-making. We here focus on the beneficial but neglected role of indeterminacy
in real-world problem solving and argue that the right PFC complements the left PFC
“interpreter” by maintaining, and even enhancing indeterminacy. Successful real-world
functioning is a delicate balancing act between these two systems.
Keywords: hemispheric asymmetry, hemispheric specialization, reasoning, hemispheric lateralization, real-world
problem solving, ill-structured problems
Introduction
Some degree of hemispheric asymmetry seems to be a principle of brain organization in most, if not
all, species (Denenberg, 1981; Toga and Thompson, 2003). Since the issue came to prominence in
the 1950s, with the pioneering work by Sperry and colleagues (Sperry, 1982; Gazzaniga, 1995), on
split brain patients, a number of studies have demonstrated differences in hemispheric organization
ranging all the way from physiological and structural cellular organization (Glick et al., 1982; Zilles
et al., 1996), to functional differences at the level of sensory motor (Amunts et al., 1996; Coghill
et al., 2001), language (Levy et al., 1971; Levy, 1976; Knecht et al., 2000), visual-spatial (Ratcliff,
1979; Christman, 1989), attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), emotion (Davidson, 1992), and
complex cognition systems (Gazzaniga, 1985, 1995).
Despite overwhelming evidence for hemispheric asymmetry, answers to questions regarding
the functional basis of the asymmetry remain elusive (Springer and Deutsch, 1998). Proposals
fall into two basic categories: they either focus on the properties of the stimuli, or characterize
asymmetry in terms of differences in processing styles (Stephan et al., 2003). With respect to
the former, the distinction has been between verbal and visual-spatial modalities, where verbal
is largely left hemisphere (LH) and visual-spatial is largely right hemisphere (RH; Ratcliff, 1979;
Frost et al., 1999). Proposals that implicate different processing styles include distinctions between
analytic and sequential processing (LH dominance) and holistic and parallel processing (RH
dominance; Deglin and Kinsbourne, 1996; Wharton and Grafman, 1998), the spatial frequency
hypothesis which distinguishes between local information processing (LH dominance) and global
information processing (RH dominance; Sergent, 1987; Robertson and Lamb, 1991), and categorical
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(LH dominance) and coordinate (RH dominance) representation
of spatial information (Kosslyn et al., 1989; Jager and Postma,
2003).
While each proposal captures some aspect of the data, none
has been successful in explaining a wide range of findings. For
example, the analytic/holistic distinction predicts that deductive
reasoning should be a largely LH process, while inductive
reasoning should be largely a RH process. The data indicate
otherwise (see below). It is possible that we are making a
mistake in searching for a single basis for the asymmetry and
assuming that it applies equally to all brain regions and cognitive
processes. Perhaps there are multiple bases of asymmetry and
different brain regions rely upon different ones (or even multiple
ones). The goal of this review is to introduce the principle of
indeterminacy and suggest that it plays an important role in the
hemispheric organization of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in complex
cognition.
I use the term ‘‘indeterminacy’’ to refer to uncertainty
independent of risk/reward evaluations, where, the issue is not
that a certain event will occur with a certain probability p = x,
but there is literally no fact of the matter. For example, given
the premises A > B, A > C, what is the relationship between
B and C? There are no probabilities to be assigned here. Given
this incomplete information, there is no fact of the matter as to
the relationship between B and C. It is indeterminate.1 The main
thrust of the argument is that there are hemispheric differences
in the ability of PFC to tolerate indeterminacy. The left PFC does
not tolerate indeterminacy well and will always attempt to fill in
with background information. It is suggested that this may be
a consequence of the LH’s dominance for language. The right
PFC is very good at tolerating, and even actively maintaining
and enhancing indeterminacy and keeping options open. Both
systems are required for successful problem-solving in the real
world.
Asymmetry and Complex Cognition: Left
Hemisphere Interpreter Hypothesis
Perhaps the most interesting work in the asymmetric
organization of the human brain for complex cognition has
been undertaken by Gazzaniga and colleagues (Gazzaniga, 1995,
1998). In one classic experiment involving implicit inference,
split brain patients were presented with a picture of a chicken
claw projected to the LH (right visual field) and a picture of a
snowy winter scene projected to the RH (left visual field). The
patient must then select (one with each hand), from an array of
other pictures, which two are related to the projected pictures.
The patient selects a shovel with the left hand (because the
right-hemisphere, controlling that hand, has viewed a snowy
winter scene) and a chicken with the right-hand (because the
LH, controlling that hand, viewed the chicken claw). Upon being
asked to explain the choice of the shovel with the left hand
(guided by the RH) the patient’s LH (dominant for language) has
1Elsewhere the terms ‘‘ill-structured’’ and ‘‘well-structured,’’ and ‘‘non-
notational’’ and ‘‘notational’’ representations have been used to refer to
indeterminate and determinate, respectively (Goel, 1995; Goel and Grafman,
2000).
no access to the information about the snowy scene viewed by
the RH. But instead of responding ‘‘I don’t know’’, he fabricates
a plausible story, based upon background knowledge, and
responds that the shovel is required to clean the chicken coop.
In another simpler paradigm, a picture of a saucepan, followed
by a picture of water, is shown to each hemisphere, (Gazzaniga
and Smylie, 1984). When the pictures are shown to the LH, the
patient can draw the causal inference of ‘‘boiling water’’. When
the pictures are shown to the RH, the patient cannot draw the
inference. Such findings have led to the postulation of the LH
‘‘interpreter’’, (Gazzaniga, 1995; Wolford et al., 2000; see also
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Hagoort, 2005, for related ideas)
a system compelled to connect bits of incomplete information
to make sense of the world by locking onto and extrapolating
patterns (logical, conceptual, causal, etc.). It abhors uncertainty,
and automatically fills in any gaps with assumptions based
upon background knowledge and beliefs, often prematurely and
incorrectly. This has resulted in a story of LH dominance for
reasoning and problem-solving. More recently these claims have
been localized to PFC (Wolford et al., 2000) and the components
of the interpreter are being fleshed out.
Marinsek et al. (2014) in a review, in this volume, highlight
three functions of the left PFC in reasoning and problem-solving:
(a) reduction of uncertainty; (b) sensitivity to causal connections
and inferences; and (c) inferences involving logical relationships.
To this list I would add inferences involving conceptual/semantic
relationships (if not already included). While my focus here
is largely limited to the left PFC’s role in the reduction of
uncertainty or indeterminacy, I will suggest that the latter
properties may help account for the former, and that all may be a
byproduct of the linguistic ability of the LH. Let’s look at this by
examining the role of the left PFC in deductive reasoning.
Deductive reasoning tasks involving syllogisms engage left
PFC when arguments contain believable content (e.g., all apples
are red fruit; all red fruit are delicious; therefore apples are
delicious) allowing subjects to draw upon conceptual and
semantic connections, but engage bilateral frontal systems when
arguments do not contain meaningful content (e.g., all A are B;
all B are C; therefore all A are C) and formal methods must
be utilized. In the former case, both the semantic information
and logical connections lead to the correct inference and
the LH is often sufficient. In the latter case, there is no
semantic information, and no substitute for explicit formal
logical evaluation. In such cases the RH is recruited to assist in the
inference (Goel et al., 2000, 2004).2 That the left PFC is primarily
drawing upon conceptual and semantic connections is consistent
with the results of the above experiments involving the ‘‘chicken
coop’’ and ‘‘boiling water’’ tasks. For example, there are no logical
connections between ‘‘saucepan’’ and ‘‘water’’, leading to the
conclusion of ‘‘boiling water’’, but given our world knowledge
and beliefs, there are conceptual connections. Furthermore,
2There is a single study by Deglin and Kinsbourne (1996) which endorses
the reverse position, where inferences involving formal logical relationships
engage the left hemisphere but inferences involving conceptual or semantic
connections are relegated to the right hemisphere. No other study has
replicated this result.
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when the believability of the conclusion is inconsistent with the
logical evaluation, and an effortful, explicit logical evaluation
is required, the engagement of right PFC and parietal lobes
becomes necessary (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003;
Tsujii et al., 2010, 2011).
These and other data suggest that in logical inference the
left PFC interpreter is usually our first response mechanism and
when conceptual connections and simple logical relations are
involved, it is sometimes sufficient. Several linguists have argued
that our conceptual and logical (and causal) constructs and
relationships are built into the very fabric of natural language
and derive from it (Talmy, 1983, 1988, 2003; Lakoff, 1986). Thus
it is possible that the causal, logical, and conceptual inferences
that come so effortlessly to the LH do so because it is dominant
for language. However, when the task cannot piggyback off the
semantic or logical properties of language, or if it can, but the
logical inferences required are indeterminate or too complex
(and need to be augmented by other cognitive resources), the
right PFC and parietal lobe systems are engaged. The same seems
to be true for causal inference (see below).
To further illustrate what is meant by the claim that
conceptual, logical, and causal constructs are embedded in the
structure of language, let’s consider the case of simple transitive
inference. There are a number of studies showing that many
animals, including chimpanzees (Gillan, 1981; Boysen et al.,
1993), pigeons (Delius and Siemann, 1998), and rats (Davis,
1992) can be taught to do transitive inference, or at least
behave in a manner consistent with understanding transitive
inference. Let’s set aside the questions of experimental design
and interpretation of data (Delius and Siemann, 1998; Allen,
2006), and focus on the training regime. It takes a pigeon
approximately 1600 trials to behave in a manner consistent with
simple transitive inference (Delius and Siemann, 1998). How
many trials does it take a human subject? If one uses the same
training paradigm with human participants as one does with
pigeons, it takes approximately 800 trials for a human (Acuna
et al., 2002). But when transitive relations are explicitly presented,
most of us understand in one or two trials. What this suggests is
that we are capable of learning to do transitive inference in the
same manner that a pigeon does, and we can do it in 800 trials
as opposed to 1600 trials. However, the more important point is
that we have certain cognitive resources—namely language—that
a pigeon does not. If we utilize this system we understand simple
transitive inference in one or two trials because it is built into the
structure of language.
The structure of language, and indeed much of human
thought, has been defined in terms of the properties of
systematicity, productivity, compositionality, and inferential
coherence (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Penn et al., 2008).
It can be shown that a representational system with these
properties needs to have discrete, nonoverlapping elements,
differentiable from each other, and be reasonably precise and
determinate, at least at the syntactic level (Goel, 1995). This
can be referred to as syntactic determinacy.3 Furthermore,
3It has elsewhere been referred to as a ‘‘notational scheme’’ or a ‘‘discursive
language’’ (Goodman, 1968).
given such a symbol system and an inference engine one
is automatically set up to make simple (local) logical and
conceptual and causal connections.4 Once ideas are generated
and represented in such a system they determine the parameters
of all subsequent transformations. Each inference serves
to automatically eliminate countless possibilities (reducing
uncertainty). Thus the suggestion is that the structure and
properties of this representational system gives rise to the left
PFCs intolerance for uncertainty or indeterminacy. In the next
section we focus on a complementary role of the right PFC
in inhibiting these connections and keeping options open by
endorsing uncertainty or indeterminacy.
A Role for the Right PFC
It is only within the last 20 years that neuropsychologists have
begun to examine reasoning and problem solving in a real-
world context. Much of this research has only been recently
assembled and reviewed (Goel, 2009; Marinsek et al., 2014).
The result is a greater understanding of the multiple roles the
right PFC plays in human inference. Goel (2009) identifies three
critical roles for the right PFC, namely supporting inference
in the absence of familiar conceptual content (right lateral
PFC), conflict/anomaly detection (right dorsolateral PFC) and
indeterminacy tolerance (right ventral lateral PFC). Marinsek
et al. (2014) reviewing much of the same literature, propose that
left PFC ‘‘specializes in creating hypotheses and representing
causality, while the RH specializes in evaluating hypotheses and
rejecting those that are implausible or inconsistent with other
evidence. . . . The LH strives to reduce uncertainty while the RH
strives to resolve inconsistency’’. There is some overlap, and some
interesting differences, in these two interpretations of the data.
The similarities are accepting the LH role in reducing uncertainty
and the RH’s role in resolving inconsistency.
One major difference is that we also see an important active
role for the right PFC in maintaining and even enhancing
uncertainty or indeterminacy. This issue is rarely addressed in the
reasoning and problem-solving literatures. The normal way of
viewing indeterminacy is as something undesirable that needs to
be minimized and eliminated. However, it has also been argued
that indeterminacy has a beneficial role to play in real-world
problem solving (Goel, 1995, 2014). Here we briefly summarize
thepervasiveness of indeterminacy in real-worldproblemsolving,
the importance of maintaining it (for a certain period of
time), and note that maintenance of indeterminacy requires
different cognitive representations and facilitates different types
4The meaning of ‘‘local’’ here can be illustrated with a logical example.
Suppose one is given the axiom X • (¬A⊃B), and asked to prove the theorem
(B∨ A) • X. Few people would have on hand a rule or function to directly
map one onto the other. However, we can all arrive at the theorem by the
sequential application of simple rules applied locally as in the following
sequence:
L1: X • (¬ A⊃B)⇒ (B ∨ A) • X [Given]
L2: (¬ A⊃B) • X [Commutative L1]
L3: (A ∨ B) • X [Material implication L2]
L4: (B ∨ A)• X [Commutative L3]
It is in this sense that logical transformations are local.
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of transformations, and that these cognitive mechanisms are
underwritten by different neural systems (Goel, 1995, 2014).
Indeterminacy results from incompleteness of information
and/or non-constitutive task constraints. Incompleteness of
information in each of the three components of a problem vector
(start state, goal state, transformation function; Reitman, 1964),
and the non-constitutive nature of the task constraints (Goel,
1995) are hallmarks of real-world problems. For example, in a
simple everyday task like planning a dinner party for some guests,
the start state is incompletely specified (e.g., Should it be lunch or
dinner?; Should it be on a Monday or Friday? etc.). The goal state
is also incompletely specified (e.g., Do I care whether they enjoy
the meal? Should I take into consideration the fact that Mary is
upset with John when doing the seating arrangement? etc.). And
finally, the transformation function is also incompletely specified
(e.g., Should the meal be catered? Should I do a potluck? If I
prepare it myself should I use free range chicken? etc.). Not
only are each of these three components of the problem space
vector under specified, they are each negotiable. So, if I invite
you to my home for dinner, and then convince you that we
should instead grab a quick pizza and go to the new movie
playing around the corner, and you agree, there is no sense
in which I have failed the planning task. The selected solution
simply lies beyond the (assumed) constraints of the original
problem.
Contrast this real-world problem with a standard laboratory
task, like the Tower of Hanoi (Kotovsky et al., 1985), a puzzle
consisting of three pegs and several disks of varying size. The
goal is to transfer the disks from one peg to another under the
following three constraints: (1) only one disk may be moved at
a time; (2) any disk not being currently moved must remain
on the pegs; and (3) a larger disk may not be placed on a
smaller disk. The Tower of Hanoi is a typical example of a
well-structured problem. In such tasks the start states, goal
states, and transformation functions are completely specified,
and the constraints are logical or constitutive of the task.
For example, if I complete the task by placing a larger disk
on a smaller disk, on route, I’ve simply cheated. The former
types of problems are called ‘‘ill-structured’’ problems while
the latter are referred to as ‘‘well-structured’’ problems. Real-
world problems have both ill-structured and well-structured
components.
The basic idea is that, when confronted with a real-world
problem, ranging from the ordinary (e.g., planning a dinner
party), to the extraordinary (e.g., designing an affordable electric
car with a range of 1000 miles), the first impulse is simply
to go with what we already know. In the mundane case of
planning a dinner party, the LH interpreter would start with
knowledge of past parties and follow the conceptual/logical
connections to the current situation and could not look beyond
(suggested and assumed) constraints. It would be a prisoner
of its background knowledge and beliefs. Every dinner party
would be similar to the last, with little allowance for the
variations and deviations that are the hallmark of human
problem solving. In the case of the extraordinary problem
solving situation, the problem solver may not have access to
any known solutions (as there may be none), but nonetheless,
there will be background beliefs and knowledge from previous
experiences that will be mapped onto the problem space. The LH
interpreter, by its acceptance and precise representation of this
belief network and task constraints, armed with local conceptual
and logical connections, would confine the problem solver
to a particular space, perhaps precluding the actual solution
space.
One way of circumventing such a depressing outcome is to
have a complementary system to the interpreter that serves to
maintain any indeterminacy that exists in the task environment
(at least for a period of time), and where indeterminacy does
not exist it serves to actively create it. In both the mundane
and novel cases the introduction of indeterminacy is serving the
function of overcoming unwarranted preconceptions based upon
prior beliefs and allowing for the exploration of a broader state
space.
Such a system would benefit from a representational
format that supports vague, ambiguous, and indeterminate
representations that have multiple interpretations that illuminate
possibilities rather than concealing them (Goel, 1995). The
transformations that operate on these representations may not
be one of conceptual and logical connections but rather some
sort of associations that allow for distal connections.5 Such a
system is necessary to tolerate and represent the indeterminacy
inherent in the real world, treating constraints and intermittent
solutions as tentative, and inhibiting premature, ill-conceived
inferences, until such time as the state space is explored, and
alternatives considered. As the solution develops, constraints
can be established and introduced into the problem space to
facilitate solution refinement and detailing. This is accompanied
by utilization of representational systems that are more precise,
unambiguous, and determinate.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 1 with an example from
architectural problem solving, reproduced from Goel (2014).
Figure 1 is a highly speculative and incomplete reconstruction
of Jørn Utzon’s problem space for the design of the Sydney
Opera House. When confronted with the design brief (problem
statement) for an opera house on the Sydney Harbor, he begins
by abstracting away from the particulars of the design brief,
and his knowledge of opera houses, to seemingly unrelated
ambiguous, amorphous, indeterminate, ‘‘meaningless’’, doodles
(Figures 1A–D) and reports making distal connections to the
Yucatán Peninsula (Mexico), Kornborg Castle (Denmark), and
the naval charts of Sydney Harbor. As he generates, selects and
develops his ideas the accompanying representations become
more precise and detailed (Figures 1E,F), until at the detailing
stage they are unambiguous and determinate (Figures 1G,H).
At this stage transformations largely involve (local) logical and
conceptual connections.
This account accepts the interpreter role for the left PFC,
but adds a critical, complementary role for the right PFC,
5See Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) for a discussion of the relationship between
conceptual connections and associations. Distal connections are in contrast
to the local connections described in footnote 4. They are based upon
various sorts of associations (perhaps serendipitous) and can be arbitrarily
far reaching.
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FIGURE 1 | A highly incomplete and speculative reconstruction of
Utzon’s problem space for designing the Sydney Opera House. Real
world problem solving usually undergoes several distinct cognitive phases
associated with different types of mental (and external) representations and
transformations. In the case of architectural problem solving they can be
broadly divided up into natural language, conceptual sketches, and contract
documents. Their level of precision and ambiguity varies. Drawings (A–D) are
examples of early conceptual sketches. There is often no fact of the matter as
to what they represent. The “what is that” is often discovered and emerges after
the drawing is made. Drawings (E) and (F) show the development of one of the
ideas introduced in the conceptual sketches. The artifact is beginning to take a
specific form and starting to be fleshed out. Drawings (G) and (H) are examples
of technical drawings or blueprints that will form part of the contract
documents. They specify the artifact in a very precise, complete, unambiguous
and determinate manner. The differences between the conceptual sketches and
working drawings (ostensibly both “pictorial”) are at least as great as the
differences between the design brief and conceptual sketches. Reproduced
with permission from Goel (2014).
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and emphasizes the interaction or balance between the two
hemispheres. It has been stated as the Frontal Lobe Lateralization
Hypothesis in Goel (2014): ‘‘The right PFC supports abstract,
vague, ambiguous, indeterminate representations of the world,
while the left PFC abhors uncertainty and tries to automatically
fill in the gaps with concrete, determinate, unambiguous, specific
information/assumptions. The system is set up in such a way
that each also tries to inhibit the other, though usually the
left dominates. Successful functioning in the real world is a
judicious balancing act between these two systems. Damage to
either system will result in impaired real-world performance,
but with different cognitive signatures. Damage to right PFC
system will allow the left PFC free reign to prematurely lock
onto patterns and solutions; drawing conclusions quickly and
confidently, often to the detriment of the patient. Damage
to the left PFC will allow the right-hemisphere system . . .
to have more impact. If it remains totally unchecked by
the LH interpreter, one would expect these patients to have
enormous difficulty in articulating details and arriving at
decisions’’.
It is worth noting that Beeman (1993; Jung-Beeman,
2005), working with linguistic data, has developed an
interesting account of hemispheric asymmetry in terms of
different types of coding of linguistic representations in
left and RHs. On this account, the RH utilizes ‘‘course’’
overlapping semantic fields to encode information, whereas
the LH engages in more finer grained, less overlapping
coding of information. If ‘‘fine coding’’ maps onto more
determinate representations and ‘‘coarse coding’’ maps onto
more indeterminate representations, then there is an overlap
between these ideas, and those developed here, that requires
further exploration.
In contrast, Corballis (2003), by examining the role of the
RH in disambiguating and resolving stimuli in visual completion
tasks, concludes that the main function of the RH is ‘‘resolving
the ambiguities inherent in spatial vision.’’ The RH does this by
creating and maintaining an analog, unambiguous, determinant,
veridical representation of the world that is used to keep in
check the generative proclivities of the LH. We, on the other
hand, are suggesting that tunnel vision is a natural byproduct of
the generative machinery of the LH that must be offset by the
indeterminacy-tolerant, associative machinery of the RH.
Evidence for Left PFC Interpreter
There is considerable evidence for the various components of
the LH interpreter. The classical split brain patient studies
(Gazzaniga and Smylie, 1984; Gazzaniga, 1998, 2000) and newer
studies on inductive inference (Goel et al., 1997; Goel and Dolan,
2004; Reverberi et al., 2005) provide support for its role inmaking
conceptual and semantic connections. Numerous studies provide
evidence for its role in semantic and simple logical inferences
(reviewed in Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). Finally, studies
by Wolford et al. (2000) provide evidence for its hypothesis
generation function, while other studies provide evidence for its
role in making simple causal connections (Gazzaniga and Smylie,
1984; Roser et al., 2005). A more comprehensive review of this
literature is provided by Marinsek et al. (2014).
Evidence for the Role of Right PFC System
Recent data suggest that right PFC is crucial in situations
where the problem space: (a) is very broad, contains incomplete
information and non-constitutive constraints; and/or (b)
contains misleading/conflicting information. These are all
hallmarks of real-world problems and robustly engage right
PFC systems. For example, we have found, in an anagram
task, that broadening semantic categories that words can
belong to (and thus the problem space) from ‘‘make the
word ‘knife’ with IKFEN’’, to ‘‘make a word for a kitchen
utensil with IKFEN’’, to ‘‘make a word with IKFEN’’,
relaxes task constraints and selectively activates right PFC
(Vartanian and Goel, 2005). Mental set shift tasks, like the
Matchstick problems, which require the overcoming of implicit
misleading cues, selectively activate right PFC in the misleading
condition (Miller and Tippett, 1996; Goel and Vartanian,
2005).
Even in a classic ‘‘LH’’ task like logical reasoning, a patient
study suggests a double dissociation such that patients with
lesions to left PFC are selectively impaired in determinate trials
(e.g., A > B, B > C, A > C; and A > B, B > C, C > A),
while patients with lesions to right PFC are selectively impaired
in indeterminate trials (e.g., A > B, A > C, B > C; Goel et al.,
2007). Neuroimaging studies reveal similar results (Goel et al.,
2009; Brzezicka et al., 2011).
With respect to causal inference, at least one study, involving
split brain patients, shows a double dissociation between the
ability of the LH and the RH to deal with simple well-
structured causal relations (as in ‘‘billiard ball causation’’), and
more complex, indeterminate, difficult to discern and resolve
spatiotemporal relationships between events (Roser et al., 2005).
The LH is great at the former but the latter requires the RH.
Moreover, several studies utilizing real world design and
planning tasks selectively activate right PFC systems. For
example, an imaging study carried out by Kowatari et al. (2009)
asked novice and experienced designers to ‘‘think about new
designs’’ for pens. Their main finding included greater activation
in right PFC than in left PFC, in the design component of the task.
Furthermore, a correlational analysis using the originality scores
of individuals (generated by applying a ‘‘good design award
criteria’’ metric) and BOLD signal changes showed a correlation
between the left minus right PFC BOLD signal and the originality
scores, but not between left PFC or right PFC BOLD signals and
originality scores per se. This interesting finding is consistent
with our contention that interaction between right and left PFC
are critical for real-world problem solving.
Gilbert et al. (2010) administered well-structured and ill-
structured versions of a simple design task, involving the
arrangement of furniture in a board room, to participants as
they underwent MRI scanning. The well-structured version of
the task contained specific constraints such as ‘‘the two tables
face each other’’ while the ill-structured version contained more
open-ended constraints such as ‘‘the room should feel spacious’’.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 326
Goel Hemispheric asymmetry within prefrontal cortex
The main conclusion of the study was that the ill-structured
design condition was associated with greater activation in right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared to the well-structured
condition.
Two patient studies, involving real world design and
planning tasks, have reached the same conclusion. Goel
and Grafman (2000) tested a very accomplished 57 year old
architect diagnosed and treated for a right frontal parasagittal
meningioma, by requiring him to develop a new design for
their lab space, and compared his performance to an age and
education matched architect. The control architect began the
task by considering abstract issues such as ‘‘circulation space’’
and ‘‘social/professional hierarchies’’, and then used these
abstract concepts to determine arrangements of walls, cubicles,
etc. The patient’s sophisticated architectural knowledge base
was still intact and he used it quite skillfully during the problem
scoping phase to discuss various aspects of the design. However,
he approached the design task at a very concrete level and just
arranged furniture. He generated a quick solution, without
abstracting from the particulars and exploring the space of
alternatives.
In another study, Goel et al. (2013) administered a real-
world planning task to neurological patients with unilateral
lesions in PFC and normal controls. Patients with lesions to
right PFC generated substandard solutions compared to both
normal controls and patients with left PFC lesions. Examination
of the underlying cognitive processes and strategies revealed
that patients with lesions to right PFC approached the task at
an excessively concrete level compared to normal controls, and
very early locked themselves into substandard solutions. Patients
with lesions to left PFC displayed a trend towards approaching
the task at a more abstract level than the controls, and more
fully explored solution possibilities. In contrast to both patient
groups, normal controls engaged in the task at both concrete
and abstract levels and easily/judiciously moved between the
levels.
These data suggest differences in the capacity of left and right
PFC to deal with indeterminacy. They confirm the ‘‘interpreter’’
role of the left PFC but also highlight the critical role of the
right PFC in tolerating indeterminacy, exploring alternative
possibilities, and inhibiting premature conclusions. These
differences are difficult to detect in standard neuropsychological
test batteries (because these tasks are largely well-structured) but
they become apparent in real-world tasks which contain both
well-structured and ill-structured components.
Conclusion
The goal of this review has been to suggest that determinacy
of information and constraints is one important principle
of functional organization in PFC that emerges in the
examination of real-world problem-solving and reasoning.
Indeterminacy results from incompleteness of information and
non-constitutive task constraints inherent in real-world
problems. It is often viewed as something undesirable,
requiring immediate elimination. This review makes the
case that it is generally beneficial to retain a level of
indeterminacy in many problem-solving situations to prevent
tunnel vision. What is required is a controlled reduction of
possibilities.
As illustrated in Figure 1, in the early phases of problem
solving, one needs to step back from the particulars of the
problem statement and treat the constraints as negotiable.
This allows one to explore a larger space. Ambiguity and
indeterminacy are desirable properties in the problem
representation at this stage, and associative machinery is
used to make distal connections that lie beyond the scope of
local logical/conceptual inferences. As ideas are generated,
merged, separated, rejected, and selected, the accompanying
problem representations become more precise and detailed,
and the transformations begin to take more advantage of
logical and conceptual connections. This is a cyclical process
usually requiring multiple iterations. The end state should
be an unambiguous and determinate representation of the
solution.
The data indicate that left PFC is unable to tolerate
indeterminacy. I have suggested that this may be a consequence
of the LH’s dominance for language. Language can be
characterized as being syntactically determinate and also having
the properties of generativity, systematicity, productivity, and
inferential coherence. The system is essentially set up to frame
the world in terms of its existing belief network and to integrate
new information into the belief network by making local causal,
logical, and conceptual connections5. As such, it is difficult for
the left PFC to look beyond simple inferences from what it
already knows. The right PFC, on the other hand, tolerates and
represents indeterminacy by utilizing representations with very
different properties than syntactic determinacy, generativity,
systematicity, productivity, and inferential coherence. This
allows it to bypass the tunnel vision of the left PFC and more
broadly explore the state space.
Indeterminacy is offered as one basis of hemispheric
lateralization. The idea emerges from the study of problem
solving in real-world situations. It is not meant to
account for all of the data on hemispheric lateralization.
However, there are some intriguing connections between the
determinacy/indeterminacy distinction and some earlier ideas
mentioned in the introduction.
For instance, if we take seriously the idea that the processing
capabilities of the left PFC interpreter emerge from the properties
of natural language, and that the processing capabilities of the
right PFC emerge from the properties of nonlinguistic types
of representational systems (or at least systems that are not
syntactically determinate and do not possess the properties
of systematicity, productivity, generativity, and inferential
coherence), we are taken back to earlier distinctions between
verbal and visual-spatial systems (Ratcliff, 1979; Frost et al., 1999;
Corballis, 2003).
The indeterminate/determinate distinction is more abstract
and, I believe, largely independent of the verbal/visual-spatial
distinction per se. This is illustrated in the architectural example
in Figure 1 (which involves both linguistic and pictorial
representations), and has been argued in detail elsewhere
(Goel, 1995). However, it may be the case that the linguistic
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 326
Goel Hemispheric asymmetry within prefrontal cortex
lends itself more readily to determine expressions while the
nonlinguistic lends itself to indeterminate expressions (but
counterexamples are easy to generate).6 This is why the focus
should be on the determinate/indeterminate properties of
representations rather than linguistic and visual-spatial per se.
6For example, much of the poetry of Shelley is amorphous, multifaceted,
and ambiguous. It maps onto many different interpretations. On the
other hand, legal documents, scientific writings, etc. strive to be
precise and unambiguous, and minimize alternative interpretations.
Similarly, with nonlinguistic representations, the exploratory conceptual
sketches of architects and engineers are amorphous, multifaceted, and
ambiguous, but the subsequent working drawings or blueprints are precise,
determinate, and unambiguous. There is a one-to-one mapping between
the drawings, the world, and back again. The real issue is to what extent
representational systems allow for the encoding of indeterminate states of
affairs.
Another traditional hemispheric distinction is in terms of
local (LH dominance) vs. global (RH dominance) processing
(Sergent, 1987; Robertson and Lamb, 1991). It may also be
possible to make sense of this in terms of the fact that logical and
conceptual inferences built into the machinery of language are
typically local while associations can be arbitrarily far-reaching.
Similarly, in the categorical vs. coordinate distinction (Kosslyn
et al., 1989; Jager and Postma, 2003), one could argue that
categories require a subject/predicate distinction built into the
structure of natural language, while coordinate representations
do not. These potential connections may warrant further
exploration.
Finally, this is not a LH or RH account of reasoning and
problem-solving. It is an account whereby each hemisphere is
biased towards certain types of representational structures and
processing mechanisms, distinguishable on the basis of how
they deal with determinacy/indeterminacy. Successful real-world
functioning requires the participation of both hemispheres.
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